A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz for the project "European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation" (ERPL).
Introduction 1
Set in motion by the Group of twenty (G20) 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, the governance of the global market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives is undergoing a metamorphosis. The reform programme targets various fundamental elements of OTC derivatives contracts with a view to better managing systemic risks and enhancing transparency and financial stability. The key reforms include 1) mandatory clearing of standardised derivatives in so-called central counterparties (CCPs), 2) the execution of adequately liquid contracts on transparent and organised trading venues, 3) the reporting of trades to special trade repositories, and 4) subjecting non-cleared bilateral derivatives to regulatory capital and margin requirements.
The reform was triggered by the findings about how OTC derivatives, in particular credit default swaps (CDS), contributed to the Global Financial Crisis. 2 The process means a sea change for a market that used to be subject to little public rules but operated instead under a system of sophisticated, transnational self-regulation. The sheer size of the market, valued notionally at USD 553 trillion at the end-June 2015 3 , would make a good case for getting the rules right. But the instalment of the new system has gone anything but smoothly especially where majority of the trading in derivatives takes place, that is, in the United States and Europe. In many important respects the final rules are yet to be agreed upon, or their full force postponed. In Europe, they key legislation European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 4 entered into force already in August 2012, but the market is still operating under a transitional regime.
A big factor behind the implementation problems is the lack of supporting changes in the global governance architecture for financial markets where soft law dominates. The fundamental problem remains: "how to regulate cross-border business activity in a system that defines regulatory sovereignty as territorial prerogative". 5 Because of this, the result has been a shift from a relatively harmonised private regime to a public regulatory space fragmented by diverse territorial jurisdictions. Consequently, regulators face a formidable task of coordinating their rulemaking procedures with their foreign colleagues whose legislative mandates, reform calendars, priorities, and even incentives are often different from their own. . I wish to thank all the participants and commentators for their insightful feedback. I am also indebted to Emilios Avgouleas, John C. Coffee, and Hans Micklitz for their helpful comments. 2 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Report (The FCIC Report), p. 50-51. 3 See Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, June 2015, p. 24-25. The number and value of outstanding positions has been in significant decline, which according to BIS is due to advances made in new trade compression technologies helping to eliminate "redundant" contracts. It should also be noted that the gross market value of all reported derivatives contracts is significantly smaller. Furthermore, if legally enforceable bilateral netting agreements are taken into account, the number is significantly smaller still. The nature of the new rules exacerbates coordination difficulties. Rules such as capital adequacy requirements are entity-specific, but many derivatives rules apply instead to the transactions themselves. The concentration rules, which force standardised contracts into centralised clearing and on organised trading venues, are good examples of such transaction-level rules. Such rules capture, by default, both sides of the contract. For instance, when the EU mandates that all interest rate derivative contracts must be cleared in an authorised clearinghouse, this rule captures also all the non-EU counterparties to such contracts. On a market in which the parties to contracts are more often than not situated in different jurisdictions this introduces clear compliance problems. For instance, in 2012 around 80 per cent of credit derivative transactions had a cross-border element. 7 At the time Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy it had hundreds of thousands of contracts outstanding with around 8,000 different counterparties around the globe. 8 The question of whose rules to comply with is made all the more difficult by the fact that many rules have been given extraterritorial effects which means that they can capture trades which have a weak connection, if any, to the rule-issuing jurisdiction. In such a system jurisdictional conflicts are omnipresent.
As the term "cross-border regulatory space" in the title of this paper suggests, the global derivatives reforms are creating a regulatory space in which jurisdictional borders are increasingly elusive. In fact, also in cross-border dialogues the pervasive cross-border coordination problems have been labelled as "joint jurisdiction" issues. 9 Reports such as "EU and US aim for May deal on derivatives clearing" 10 or "Europe and US fail to agree on derivatives rules" 11 reflect well the fact like all shared regulatory spaces, the cross-border regulatory space for OTC derivatives is highly contested.
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This paper sheds some light on the source and nature of the implementation and coordination problems overshadowing the OTC derivatives reform. The Transatlantic derivatives dispute provides a useful laboratory for the analysis of a more general problem to which the Financial Stability Board (FSB) now habitually refers to as "Cross-Border Regulatory Issues". To understand the problems, one needs first to understand the markets and how the new rules are affecting them. For that reason, the next section will shortly introduce financial derivatives and the regulatory reforms aimed at the OTC derivatives market.
Second, the paper assesses the present regulatory strategies available for addressing jurisdictional conflicts and disputes between regulators, as well as for exerting influence towards weaker countries. The dominant regulatory strategy, which is dubbed here the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, builds on unilateralist application of extraterritoriality, various forms of direct and indirect protectionism, and conditional deference. In the EU the so called "equivalence regime" allows for the possibility to disapply EU rules in favour of the rules of another jurisdiction whose regulatory and supervisory regime has been considered adequately equivalent. In the United States "substituted compliance" framework similarly makes possible deference to another jurisdiction's rules. Such deference strategies should be seen are carrots, which are applied together with the sticks of extraterritoriality and protectionism to drive regulatory convergence towards the strongest.
What drives the Regulate Thy Neighbour policies is the fear of regulatory arbitrage, an art of optimizing the costs of regulation via allocation of financial activities in different jurisdictions. Regulatory arbitrage is a contentious policy issue, as it can negatively impact not only the reaching of the reforms' ultimate policy objectives, but also jobs and market share. This has set the EU and US on crash course and resulted in a "transatlantic regulatory turf war". 13 The "looming cross-Atlantic derivatives trade war" and the forms of "new 21st century protectionism" 14 stand as good evidence of the shortcomings of the horizontal network model of global financial governance. Like its historical precursor Beggar Thy Neighbour, the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategies adversely affect cross-border trade, this time in financial instruments and services. The market response has been gradual but dramatic in magnitude. Once a very global market now faces a real risk of fragmentation and disintegration. Reports have witnessed a significant drop in international trading activity.
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Adopting a pragmatic stance, the paper argues that in the short term a successful completion of the transatlantic partnership is needed in order to reach the reform's ultimate goals. 16 The transatlantic partnership can revive the transgovernmentalist idea of exporting rules to "weaker states" without hierarchy.
17 This might mitigate the crucial regulatory arbitrage problems without the need to retreat to protectionism and continued financial fragmentation. However, the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy, which can also work in through a bilateral alliance or "trade block" has various problems, both practical and political. Therefore, the paper also argues for gradual abandonment of the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach and for the simultaneous building of a regime based on embryonic forms of mutual recognition. As a first step, the key risk management standards agreed on supra-state level need to be served in a binding form. The Financial Stability Board as an increasingly important umbrella organisation and its member organisations such as IOSCO need to be upgraded and empowered in order to foster cooperation and coordination beyond the Atlantic.
The creation of cross-border regulatory space for OTC derivatives transactions

Short introduction to financial derivatives
Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on the performance and price of a reference asset, rate or index or some other underlying variable.
18 Derivatives can offer end-users protection against market and/or credit risks. Hedging reduces risks through contracting away exposures to negative price movements or events (such as rise of fuel prices, or debtor's default). Derivatives are also used for speculation or arbitrage. Speculation basically involves taking a position in the market and thus, unlike hedging, also includes the possibly limitless upside. Arbitrageurs differ from both hedgers and speculators in that they seek riskless profits by identifying and exploiting opportunities, usually short-lived, created by price differentials or disparities between two or more markets.
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Options and forwards provide the ancestral building blocks of practically all derivatives. 20 A forward is simply "an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain future time for a certain price", whereas an option holder has the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset at a certain future time. 21 Another basic derivatives contract is a future, a standardized contract traded on-exchange. Swaps are forward-based OTC contracts that have usually been traded bilaterally, i.e. off-exchange. Parties to swap contracts basically agree to exchange different sequences of cash flows. 22 For example, a standard ("plain vanilla") interest rate swap exchanges fixed interest cash flows to floating interest cash flows. Credit Default Swaps (CDS) offer protection against loan default. Swaps dominate the OTC market: based on their overwhelming success, swaps have been considered as "one of the most successful innovations in financial markets ever". 23 At the most complex end, derivatives can themselves act as the underlying asset, which is often the case in structured or securitized financial products combining a security (usually fixed income bonds) with one or more underlying assets (often derivatives).
24
The structure of the market for financial derivatives is primarily shaped by the following three factors. These distinctions, though somewhat simplified, are important for grasping the on-going regulatory reforms and the policy objectives sought after:
1. The place of execution of the contract: all derivatives are either traded "over-the-counter" (OTC derivatives) or through regulated exchanges (exchange-traded derivatives). OTC derivatives dominate the global derivatives market: In June 2013, only 9 per cent of all derivatives where traded on exchange. 25 The exchanges offer a limited number of products, which are typically made of inflexible terms and conditions set by the exchanges themselves. Therefore, the pace of innovation is higher in the OTC market where contracts can be customized. Unlike most OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives are transferable, i.e. there is a secondary market providing continuous maturity. OTC contracts can have maturities ranging from months to years and even decades. For instance, in end-2015 almost a quarter of interest rate derivatives had maturities of more than 5 years. 26 2. Clearing, or the use of central counterparty: derivatives cleared through a central counterparty (CCP) are distinguished from those executed bilaterally or through some alternative contractual arrangement; CCPs are a special type of clearinghouse which sit in between the derivatives deals, taking a position of a buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer. Centralized clearing effectively mitigates both payment and delivery risks. 27 All exchange-traded derivatives are centrally cleared, but not all centrally cleared derivatives are traded on exchanges.
3. Level of standardization: another important difference is that between standardized derivatives and non-standardized derivatives. All non-standardized, bilaterally negotiated derivative contracts are OTC derivatives. They comprise "myriad privately negotiated transactions" which can be infinitely tailored. 28 Standardisation of contractual terms and certain operational processes is the key requirement for any OTC derivative to be eligible for CCP clearing. In addition, there must exist an adequately liquid market with pricing sources that are fair, reliable and generally accepted. 29 For various reasons, many standardized derivatives have not been cleared through a CCP.
The ISDA summarizes the differences between different classes of derivatives in the following way: Uncleared and non-exchange traded OTC derivatives were at the centre of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and thus they have been the focus of policy and regulatory action as well.
Regulation of OTC derivatives before the crisis
The problem with OTC derivatives is that they offer effective tools also for regulatory arbitrageurs, meaning that they can be used to exploit differences and disparities in different jurisdictions as wellby definition for "riskless" profits. 30 Second, they allow virtually endless leveraging and can accumulate and concentrate credit risks in the opaque corners of the global financial market. Third, little data has been available about the OTC market.
The AIG bailout proved just how dangerously these aspects could be combined. The AIG built up massive exposure on the OTC derivatives market through its London-based subsidiary AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). The primary business of AIGFP was selling protection against mortgage defaults by way of CDS contracts. Because of its solid credit rating (the CDS contracts were guaranteed by the parent company) AIGFP was able to do so hardly committing up-front capital (called "initial margin"). This was, and still is, the established market practice. When things started to unravel (Lehman not the least) and the infamous collateral calls amassed, the implosion of AIG and with it the entire apex of the financial system was quickly a matter of days. Ultimately, the rescue operation cost about 180 USD billion in taxpayer funds. The AIG story could be examined as an example of bad risk management practices -had there been any.
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OTC derivatives have traditionally been subject to minimal state intervention and light supervision. Despite the size and exponential growth of the OTC market, the regulatory framework for financial derivatives has remained piecemeal or non-existent. 32 The firms that use or deal with OTC derivatives have been subject to various rules (e.g. capital rules) but the instruments themselves have managed for long to avoid fundamental regulatory scrutiny. 33 In the US, the deregulation movement gained momentum especially during the 1990s, culminating in the passing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000. 34 It is true that the common conception of OTC derivatives markets as essentially "unregulated" neglects the extensive self-regulation by what has been called "transnational private regulators". 35 The materials, terms, and standards offered by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) provide the dominant contractual framework for OTC transactions. Since the 1980s, the ISDA has 30 See Partnoy, Frank. "Financial derivatives and the costs of regulatory arbitrage." J. Corp. L. 22 (1996): 211. ("My point is not that derivatives use necessarily results in some harm to society; rather, it is that because derivatives often are used to reduce or avoid the costs of financial regulation, the question of whether increased derivatives use is "good" or "bad" depends on the particular use.") 31 For a detailed plot of the entire AIG debacle, see The FCIC Report, p. 344-et seq. developed the documentation hand in hand with market development and innovation. 36 The primary purpose of the ISDA Master Agreement is to provide boilerplate terms for non-economic issues (default events, governing law and jurisdiction, etc.) while leaving the determination of key economic provisions for the parties themselves (terms on interest rate, maturity, collateral etc.). 37 Given the overwhelming success of the market and its private law underpinnings, it is not surprising that OTC derivatives have offered a particularly fertile ground for theories of transnational law.
38
Despite OTC derivatives, primarily CDS contracts, are high on the list of culprits that caused the Global Financial Crisis, derivatives also offer advantages in the form of risk management (hedging) and transaction costs. Thus their regulation has been a controversial issue for decades. A prominent issue has been the disparity between regulated, exchange-traded derivatives on one hand, and unregulated (or self-regulated) over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives on the other. A sensible public policy goal has for long been to level the playing field by either deregulating exchange-traded derivatives or regulating OTC derivatives. 39 Twenty years ago the deregulation argument seemed sensible for many. 40 But with the experience of the Global Financial Crisis, the exact opposite is being done as the regulatory space is being expanded to cover the entire market.
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Creating the regulatory space for OTC derivatives
The on-going reforms, originating from G20, seek to mitigate systemic risk and improve market transparency. 42 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) acting under the auspices of G20 has been tasked to coordinate the reforms between national legislators and regulators as well as international standard setting bodies such as International Organization for Securities Committees (IOSCO) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In the European Union, most of the G20 commitments concerning derivatives are implemented in the EMIR and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). The EMIR sets a mandatory clearing obligation for those classes of standardised OTC derivative contracts, which have been declared subject to clearing obligation (Articles 4 and 5 of EMIR). Furthermore, the MiFIR lays down a trading obligation requiring that all sufficiently liquid 41 Here the term regulatory space is used in a way that excludes private ordering. In short, regulatory space is taken as an analytical construct defined "by the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision". Hancher and Moran, op. cit., 153 (emphasis added). 42 Group of 20, Declaration, Pittsburgh summit, September 2009. In particular, the G20 leaders declared that "all standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements." and cleared OTC derivatives must be traded on trading venues. 43 For the private part of the market, those OTC derivatives that remain uncleared are subjected to capital and collateral requirements as well as to various risk mitigation obligations in order to better measure, monitor and mitigate operational risk and counterparty credit risk (Art. 11 of EMIR). Also, all derivative contracts must be reported to a registered or recognized trade repository (Art. 9 of EMIR). Titles III to V of EMIR lay down an extensive and detailed regime for CCPs, including a system for recognising third-country CCPs. Titles VI and VII do the same for Trade Repositories.
To illustrate the reach and practical effects of the new rules, let us take a closer look at rules concerning collateral and margin. The level and form of accepted collateral required from the buyer of a derivative has traditionally been set by the exchanges and clearinghouses or, in the case of uncleared and non-exchange traded derivatives, by the parties to the contracts themselves. In the first case, the exchanges and clearinghouses act as centralized sources for minimum margining terms. 44 The CCPs require margins from their clearing members, who must also make contributions to special default funds. Margins comprise a fixed component, "initial margin", that is paid up front and a "variation margin" reflecting changes in the value of open positions. 45 Nowadays CCPs are heavily regulated, including their praised margining systems. One of the reasons for regulatory intervention is that while the regulatory push for standardization of OTC derivatives and the mandatory offloading of such contracts to the perceived safety of centralised clearing creates a lot of new business for CCPs, the competitive environment could also start pressuring CCPs to lower their risk management requirements. The European regulator has expressed the concern in clear terms: "CCPs should not reduce their margins to a level that compromises their safety as a result of the existence of a highly competitive environment". 46 In the case of uncleared OTC derivatives, an industry association (ISDA) continues to offer the standard contractual framework for the transaction, leaving the ultimate economic choices to the parties themselves. This system has been prone to systematic undercollateralization. 47 Recall that the triple-A rating of the AIG made its counterparties feel secure enough to not require collateral up front. A logical regulatory countermeasure was therefore the introduction of mandatory collateralisation for such non-standardized OTC contracts. This means that legislators and regulatory agencies, in liaison with global standard setter organisations, will in the future determine both the eligible forms and minimum level of margins for bilateral, privately negotiated OTC derivatives. More stringent margining requirements aim at reducing systemic risk, but also set incentives for moving OTC derivatives towards centralised clearing. 48 The rationale of the policy initiatives is straightforward. In contrast to the OTC markets, derivatives clearinghouses were able to navigate through the financial crisis relatively unharmed and, most 43 Article 32 of the Regulation 600/2014 of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments, OJ L 173 (MiFIR). 44 Margining is in practice carried out through various margining accounts upheld on all levels of transaction. Therefore, for instance, clearing margin posted by a clearing member is different from the margin posted by the investor with the broker. Finally, the broker has its own margin account with the clearing member (unless it is a member of the clearing organisation itself). Hull, op. cit., p. 29-30. 45 importantly, meet their obligations without taxpayer support. 49 A reformed derivatives market with more centrally cleared derivatives is expected to prove more resilient in the next crisis. The reforms are biting: The FSB reports a clear general trend towards increased clearing. 50 Majority of OTC derivatives are already cleared through CCPs (60 per cent already in 2013 51 ) and more is expected to follow after the new regulations enter into force. Progress has been made especially in the market for interest rate derivatives 52 but also more credit default swaps are finding CCPs. 53 However, it would be a mistake to assume that all privately negotiated OTC derivatives will eventually be cleared through CCPs, let alone traded on exchanges. The OTC market segment will be smaller and subject to more regulation, but substantial portion of the market will remain uncleared. 54 Moreover, strict separation between OTC and exchange-based derivative markets has always been somewhat misleading, as the markets are in part complementary and in constant competition with each other. 55 The regulatory push towards centralized clearing has not terminated the competition between public and private derivatives markets: the flexibility and lighter cost structure of the OTC market can still trump the safety of exchange-based trading. 56 The OTC market will remain the primary source of innovation in the market for derivatives.
Implementation between soft multilateralism and hard unilateralism
Divergence, gaps, overlaps, and arbitrage
Much of the consensus that has been reached under the G20 umbrella has been lost in implementation, where soft principles and policy goals have been translated into hard rules. The global regulatory response has given rise to an uneven playing field characterized by conflicts, inconsistencies, overlaps and gaps. 57 The FSB's recent progress report summarises the prevailing cross-border concerns in the following way:
"Several authorities also note that unevenness in the pace of implementation of reforms, as well as inconsistencies or gaps in the application of requirements to cross-border transactions, can result in duplicative or overlapping requirements or lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Some 55 Nystedt, op. cit., 7. 56 See Mike Kentz, Equity derivatives traders warm to OTC, Reuters.com, 13 April 2014, reporting that a "host of market factors are driving equity traders back to the shade of OTC markets". Chicago Board Options Exchange has reportedly submitted a letter to the SEC highlighting the fact that despite regulatory efforts, the markets are moving away from exchanges. However, at the same time, centralised clearing model is being embraced by entirely new asset classes, perhaps the most important example being the repo market, which provides the key short-term, wholesale funding mechanism for the global financial market. This summary nicely captures the mix of issues currently at play and also provides a road map for the rest of this article. 59 The differing scope of rulebooks causes various compatibility issues. For example, a standard scenario is that one jurisdiction requires mandatory clearing of a certain OTC derivatives transactions through a CCP and/or the execution of that trade on a regulated market while the other jurisdiction leaves the choice to the markets. 60 Also personal scopes of regulations can differ: EMIR for instance generally exempts intra-group trades from the clearing requirement 61 in addition to which occupational pension providers are generally exempted, which is not the case in the US. EU rules more generally apply as a rule in a similar fashion to both financial and certain non-financial counterparties, whereas in the US the scope more limited. 62 Inconsistencies can arise also in the context of inconsistent trade reporting requirements. 63 Direct regulatory conflicts represent the most challenging kind of coordination problems. They arise when one jurisdiction's rules cannot be followed without breaching the requirements of another.
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Margin requirements offer a prominent example: the rules do not only deal with posting the required amount of margin (which could be agreed as meeting the regulatory standard, whichever is the highest), but they can set conflicting requirements with respect to division between initial and variable margins, eligible classes of collateral, as well as segregation of collateral. Divergence is a product of many factors. The implementation processes are not synchronized and they must navigate through multiple stages and levels also nationally and regionally. 66 Moreover, different political systems and regulatory cultures produce diverse outcomes, ranging from detailed rules-based approaches to flexible principles-based approaches. This has been true for OTC derivatives reforms as well. 67 Detailed rule-based systems can be difficult to combine with more flexible, principles-based approaches. On the other hand, very detailed rule-based systems are particularly prone to creating jurisdictional conflicts and inconsistencies, as evidenced by the US-EU negotiations. Lack of credible commitment can also produce divergence. In the absence of binding international agreements and organisations enforcing them, international soft law commitments are vulnerable to political reconsiderations and compromises. Though regulators can officially adopt the agreed common standards, they can also under-enforce or ignore them in the practice of supervision. 68 The commitment can also simply be missing. For instance, not every important market is located in G20 jurisdictions (e.g. Singapore). Finally, even if regulatory agencies would have the appropriate incentives and means to cooperate and coordinate the reforms, their legislative mandates can be ambiguous, incompatible and often even shared with other national regulators, imposing coordination needs also nationally.
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The Regulate Thy Neighbour approach
The coordination and implementation problems are made all the more challenging by the fact that the lawmakers, especially in the U.S. and EU, have sought to apply their rules extraterritorially in order to curb regulatory arbitrage and protect their market share. For instance, the EMIR generally applies to contracts entered into between non-EU entities where those contracts would have a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect in the EU or if it were necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any its provisions. 70 The EU's approach to extraterritoriality was adopted apparently in response to the aggressive stance of the U.S. as evidenced by the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and its interpretation by the US regulators. 71 The DFA in the U.S. provides that the provisions on derivatives (the DFA uses the term "swap") will apply to activities outside the United States that either (i) have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States or that (ii) such activities contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe or promulgate as are 66 Arner, Douglas W., and Michael W. 70 See e.g. art. 11(12) on the risk management requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. The requirements apply extraterritorially "to OTC derivative contracts entered into between third country entities that would be subject to those obligations if they were established in the Union, provided that those contracts have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the Union or where such obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of this Regulation." See also the final ESMA report on draft regulatory technical standards on direct, substantial and foreseeable effect in the EU, endorsed by the European Commission necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of the DFA 72 The extraterritorial application of DFA has been further defined in various SEC and CFTC rules and guidance documents.
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Realising the accumulation of grave implementation problems, and market fragmentation risks, the FSB has recurrently urged regulators to (a) identify the cross-border application of rules to infrastructure, market participants, and products; (b) identify concrete examples of any overlaps, inconsistencies and conflicts; and (c) develop options for addressing these issues. 74 Perhaps most importantly, the G20 declared in 2013 that "jurisdictions and regulators should be able to defer to each other when it is justified by the quality of their respective regulatory and enforcement regimes, based on similar outcomes, in a non-discriminatory way, paying due respect to home country regulation regimes". 75 Both the EU and U.S. have introduced a regulatory framework for allowing deference. The EU Commission, assisted by ESMA, may adopt implementing acts declaring that the legal, supervisory and enforcement arrangements of a third country are equivalent to the requirements laid down in EMIR (Art. 13(2)). Upon such determination, market participants can comply with EU requirements by being compliant with the requirements of their own non-EU jurisdiction "where at least one of the counterparties is established in that third country"(Art. 13(3) of the EMIR). Upon such equivalence decision, ESMA can formally recognise a third-country CCP or a third-country Trade Repository and authorise them to provide services in the EU area. ESMA may not recognise a CCP or a trade repository unless and before the Commission adopts an implementing act determining that the legal and supervisory arrangements of the third country where the CCP is established are equivalent, and that the CCPs and Trade Repositories in that country are subject to effective supervision and enforcement procedures. 76 If circumstances change, ESMA can withdraw the recognition, or the Commission review its equivalence decision. An interesting question, especially in light of the ECJ's recent Safe harbour decision 77 , is whether and to what extent a national competent authority of an EU Member State in exercising its prudential supervisory mandate would have the power to assess the adequacy of a third country's regulatory framework in an individual case. In any case, the ECJ undoubtedly has the power to review the validity of the Commission's equivalence decisions. (not yet reported). In the case the Court confirmed that regardless of the Commission's safe harbour decision concerning the United States data protection regime, national authorities must be able to independently examine whether the transfer of personal data to a foreign jurisdiction complies with the requirements laid down in the EU Data Protection Directive (para. 57). The Court went on to declare the Commission safe harbour decision invalid. It is noteworthy that the judgement was in large part based on various article of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 78 I thank Hans-W. Micklitz for pointing out the relevance of the Safe harbour decision.
EU's regulatory objectives is assessed from "a holistic perspective". 79 In practice, however, the assessment is preceded by a detailed line-by-line comparison exercise. The European Commission has so far adopted nine equivalence decisions with respect to the regulatory regimes for CCPs of nine countries. 80 On the basis of these equivalence decisions ESMA has recognised eleven third-country CCPs from four different jurisdictions, thus allowing these CCPs to provide clearing services in the EU. Crucially, none of these CCPs are from the U.S. as the Commission has not adopted a decision on the equivalence of the U.S. derivatives regime.
Much like in the EU, the extraterritorial effect of U.S. regulation can be lifted in the framework of substituted compliance. In its original form substituted compliance was designed to open up the possibility for foreign actors wishing to conduct business in the US to avoid burdensome and duplicative SEC registration requirements and certain other U.S. rules. 81 The more recent "secondgeneration" substituted compliance framework is designed more with a view to limiting the extraterritorial application of the Dodd-Frank Act. 82 Under the substituted compliance regime, certain offshore persons and entities that might come under the scope of U.S. rules can instead comply with regulations in their home jurisdictions.
In December 2013 the CFTC issued a series of comparability determinations covering the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Switzerland and making favourable determinations in favour of all six -nevertheless only with respect to so-called "entity-level" requirements. As to "transaction-level" requirements, the E.U. and Japan were deemed comparable only in limited cases and clearing and trade execution rules were excluded from the scope altogether. 83 The idea behind the distinction between "entity-level" and "transaction-level" rules is to simplify the cross-border application of the DFA's swap provisions. Entity-level rules are rules that apply to firms as a whole whereas transaction-level rules include the rules that apply to the individual transactions or trading. 84 The categorization exercise has proven complex and controversial. Moreover, the CFTC's approach has not been entirely consistent with that of the SEC.
The development of the derivatives rules by the CFTC and SEC respectively, and the related complexities and uncertainties, have been well documented and need not be dealt with in detail here. 85 In the simplest of terms, the present U.S. substituted compliance paradigm can be described in the 79 The conclude, the above described conditional deference strategies, such as the US substituted compliance and the EU equivalence regime should be regarded as carrots, which are applied together with the stick of extraterritorial application of rules as well as the implicit and explicit forms of protectionism. In the following, these unilateral strategies are called the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach.
The Transatlantic derivatives dispute
Given that the U.S. and EU together dominate the global derivatives market and a lot of the trades take place across the Atlantic, there is a clear need to cooperate and coordinate the reforms. The parties released in 2013 the so-called Path Forward statement, laying down a road map towards mutual recognition of derivatives rules. 87 The deal outlined a package of measures for approaching common issues with cross-border derivatives. According to the statement the parties would not seek to apply their rules "unreasonably" in the other jurisdiction, but rather "rely on the application and enforcement of the rules by the other jurisdiction."
Since the Path Forward statement the talks have been continuing in different fora, both official and unofficial. Participants have held two meetings in the context of a "Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue" (on July 8, 2014 and January 12, 2015). The purpose of these meetings has been to exchange information on regulatory developments as part of on-going dialogue, and discuss shared interests in implementation and enforcement of financial regulatory standards. 88 However, despite comforting declarations, the deal is yet to be made and the negotiations appear to be locked in stalemate. 89 The range of transatlantic negotiation issues has been detailed in the ESMA final technical advice regarding the US regulatory framework, provided to the Commission already in September 2013. The outstanding issues were numerous. 90 With regard to the implementation and execution of the clearing obligation, ESMA recognised that the EU and US regimes are broadly comparable in their principles and objectives but that there are differences in the respective scopes of the regimes, both with regard to entities and especially contracts subject to the obligation.
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In particular, ESMA made a number of reservations about the US third country CCP regime. Perhaps most importantly, the US authorities require in practice that all third country CCPs become subject to the direct jurisdiction of the US authorities. 92 In a more a recent comment, ESMA noted the drawback 86 Artomonov, op. cit., 7.
87 CFTC, press release, The European Commission and the CFTC reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives, July 11, 2013 <http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13>. 88 In addition to derivatives, the 2014 discussions covered insurance, money market funds, alternative investment fund managers, securitization, high-frequency trading, accounting, disclosures, audit, benchmarks, corporate governance, and data transfers, and information sharing for supervisory and enforcement purposes. In January 2015, the topics also included bank structural measures, money market funds, benchmarks, the implementation of EU's UCITS reforms, and macro-prudential oversight. See European Union (EU) -United States (U.S.) Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statements, July 8, 2014 and January 12, 2015. 89 See e.g. Philip Stafford, Market calls for US and Europe to end derivatives dispute, The Financial Times, September 2, 2015. 90 The report identified three broad areas of concern: 1) the recognition of third country CCPs; 2) the recognition of third of the European approach to CCP recognition, which is "extremely open" and relies fully on third country rules and supervisory arrangements. 93 This is an anomaly in international comparison as most regulators scrutinize systemically relevant infrastructures much more closely. While the EU approach presents a "model in terms of mutual reliance" this legislative choice has clearly made the transatlantic bargaining more difficult. ESMA encouraged rethinking of the full reliance approach.
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A number of difficult issues thus remain unsolved. At the centre of the current debate is the reluctance of ESMA and the EU Commission to declare the US regime for CCPs equivalent. One particularly difficult disagreement concerns the methodologies and approaches on CCPs' margining systems. 95 The failure to reach the agreement could significantly reduce cross-border derivatives activity between the EU and US, primarily because trading at home would be much cheaper than abroad. The EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) sets higher capital requirements for those transactions that are cleared through a "non-qualified" (i.e. non-authorised or non-recognised) CCP to offset the higher risk. 96 For the moment, EU banks continue to operate under "normal" lower capital requirements with regard to non-EU CCPs (including the U.S.) but this is only because under the present transitional regime the full effect of certain EMIR rules is regularly postponed. The US regulators have similarly postponed the application of various rules by issuing, e.g. targeted "no action letters".
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According to the latest reports, the parties are getting closer to agreement and the final deal is expected before a set of EU rules become effective on summer 2016. The deal, as it is envisaged, would involve both parties making concessions in terms of formal amendments in rules concerning CCP margining systems.
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Problems with the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach
Coordination costs, domestic agency fragmentation, and incompatible mandates
Deference strategies represent an important exception to the modus operandi of international financial regulation where "each state prefers to address cross-border challenges simply by applying its own laws". 99 But deference strategies also face numerous drawbacks. One is "the complexity of vetting foreign regulatory structures and devising mechanisms for ensuring that foreign supervision applies 93 ESMA, EMIR Review Report no.4. ESMA input as part of the Commission consultation on the EMIR Review, paragraph 106. 94 Ibid., paras. 108-109. ("if Europe remains the only jurisdiction relying extensively on third country rules and authorities, this might put Europe at risk and does not benefit European CCPs.") 95 Ibid. See also Remarks of CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad Before The OTC Derivatives Conference, September 29, 2015, ("We have had a very constructive dialogue with the European Commission and ESMA and I have a very good relationship with Commissioner Jonathan Hill. I believe there is an ample basis for Europe to declare us equivalent, and I think this should have happened some time ago. But we are continuing to discuss some differences in our regulatory systems and, in particular, differences related to margin methodologies.") <http://www.mondovisione.com/media-andresources/news/remarks-of-cftc-chairman-timothy-massad-before-the-otc-derivatives-conference-s/ effectively and consistently to cross-border transactions." 100 ESMA's technical advice about the equivalence of the U.S. regime serves as a good example of what kind of measures the approach entails. The advice includes a line-by-line assessment table consisting of more than 200 pages, followed by more than 1000 footnotes. The resource constraints have been noted. 101 ESMA has itself made similar remarks:
"The process for the recognition of [a third country, TC] CCP is extremely rigid and burdensome, as demonstrated by the limited number of recognition decisions taken so far. The equivalence decision process is taking much more time than expected. -This puts at risk European clearing members and their subsidiaries clearing with these TC-CCPs and creates the potential for regulatory arbitrage between European and third country CCPs." 102 Critical voices have been raised also in the US. One CFTC commissioner, in her dissenting opinion to the final rules on the international application of standards, stated that "the Commission has embarked on a cross-border analysis that I fear is taking us down a path of regulatory detail that is overly burdensome, complicated, and unnecessary." 103 The second problem is domestic agency fragmentation, which can weaken the effectiveness of international cooperation. In the U.S. the competence in the field of derivatives is shared between the SEC and the CFTC. The CFTC is the primary regulator for swaps while the SEC regulates securitybased swaps (mixed swaps are regulated jointly). In its final equivalence assessment, ESMA recognised the challenges related to the fact that the implementation of derivatives rules was not synchronized between the CFTC and SEC. 104 Research indicates that coordination tools can effectively mitigate agency conflicts in such "shared regulatory spaces" which are created by "overlapping, fragmented, and duplicative delegations". 105 This undermines the popular case for consolidating agencies under one roof as a merger might simply "convert an interagency coordination problem into an intra-agency problem". 106 However, multiple and overlapping delegations make it challenging to speak with one voice in cross-border negotiations. The more national regulators need to share their regulatory space also internationally, the case for consolidation should to become stronger, not least because there is a limited number of coordination tools available in the international sphere. 107 Brummer has also noted: "domestic divergence or fragmentation can create challenges with regard to promoting a unified "US position" across a variety of different sectors." 108 100 Jackson, op.cit. 101 Brummer, The Danger of Divergence, op.cit., 5 ("In any case, operationalizing enhanced regulatory cooperation can be resource-intensive. In order to recognize another jurisdiction as essentially equivalent, for example, regulatory agencies must familiarize themselves with practices of other jurisdictions, and then relate these practices to their own domestic financial systems. The challenge to this way forward, problematically, is the lack of manpower to oversee these kinds of mutual agreements".) 102 ESMA, EMIR Review Report no.4. ESMA input as part of the Commission consultation on the EMIR Review, Paragraph 115. 103 Statement of Commissioner Jill E. Sommers (dissenting), as annexed to the CFTC Final Rule. 104 The following comment demonstrates well the inter-agency rivalry: "While the CFTC's guidance is currently tied up in the courts for an indeterminate period of time, I can envision the SEC's methodical approach to these issues bearing fruit in the form of a robust final rule in the coming months. Aesop, the ancient Greek story teller, would be quite happy looking at the state of Title VII regulation right now. His fabled story of the tortoise and the hare seems quite appropriate, with its overarching message that "Slow and steady wins the race."" Piwowar, op. cit. 105 Freeman, Jody, and Jim Rossi. "Agency coordination in shared regulatory space." Harvard Law Review 125 (2012).
1209. 106 Ibid., 1154 107 Compare the coordination tools examined by Freeman and Rossi, ibid. 108 Brummer, The Danger of Divergence, op. cit., 14.
The third problem concerns legislative mandates and coordination lag. In the present case there seemed to have been little coordination efforts before the derivatives legislation was tabled, thus the task was left for the executive function. But when legislators incorporate into a legislative act the possibility to defer to a foreign jurisdiction on the condition of adequate substantive equivalence or comparability of rules and supervisory practices, they also authorise the regulators in charge of the implementation to engage, within the limits of their legislative mandate, in cross-border negotiations on the final content of the rulebook. A regulator's bargaining power is constrained by the legal authority delegated to it. The problem here is that while a broad mandates would likely make reaching the agreement easier, the amount of bargaining power and discretion delegated to the executive organs correlates inversely with such values as legitimacy and democracy. In any case, for the horizontal network model to work, ambitious global projects such as the OTC derivatives reform should be better coordinated already when legislation is being drafted. Tellingly, the transatlantic negotiations on the mutual recognition of derivatives rules seem to have reached a conclusion that issues need to be taken back to the legislator.
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Regulatory arbitrage, rigidity, and market fragmentation
The general problem with deference and recognition strategies such as substituted compliance is regulatory arbitrage. Unilateral export of regulatory standards works best in policy areas where regulated targets are relatively "inelastic".
110 Financial markets are very elastic and the competitive pressures that apply in the market for financial derivatives regulation are well known.
111 If foreign jurisdictions are recognised without adequate convergence, firms and transactions can start moving to friendlier jurisdictions. 112 In short, regulatory arbitrage reduces costs or captures profit opportunities that are created by different regulations or laws.
113 Like all mandatory rules regulating the private domain, the expansion of regulatory space in the area financial derivatives limits autonomy and choice, but the fact that the governance system is still built on the principle of regulatory sovereignty and territoriality 114 means that regulators can only limit choice within their sovereign regulatory space (even if this regulatory space might transcend jurisdictional borders). Those subject to rules might no longer have the freedom to choose certain economic terms of their contracts, but as a second-best option they can choose the regulatory regime providing the best terms.
Regulatory arbitrage and negative regulatory competition can undermine public policy goals. One way to look at this familiar problem is assessing it against the Financial Trilemma, which indicates that (1) financial stability, (2) cross-border financial integration and (3) national financial policies are incompatible objectives. 115 The negative effects of regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the weakening of the effectiveness of regulatory measures, is a direct consequence of not giving the other two objectives, that is, national financial policies (broadly, sovereignty 116 ) and financial integration, which allows capital to move (relatively) freely.
The accepted wisdom to counter the problem of regulatory arbitrage is harmonisation. This strategy has been put sternly into practice in the European Union with the "single rulebook" harmonisation agenda, backed by the empowerment of new authorities to implement the single set of rules. A common set of rules, or rulebooks without material differences, would effectively eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Also internationally arbitrage problems would not exist if everybody simply agreed on everything but the limits of this strategy are as obvious as the benefits of it successful completion: "Like Holy Grail, international consensus is more sought than discovered". 117 The obstacles to harmonization are numerous.
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If harmonisation is unfeasible, regulatory arbitrage concerns (which also include the risk of losing business and jobs) need to be addressed by other means. For now it seems that states might be more willing to give up on financial integration rather than building more global governance structures. There is abundant evidence of the on-going disruption and fragmentation especially in the transatlantic trading relationship. 119 Artomonov concludes that "the global derivatives market is not global anymore; rather, it has become a fragmented system of ring-fenced liquidity pools, where risk is concentrated rather than being dispersed evenly throughout the global system." 120 Regulation can promote de-globalisation in various ways. The EU for instance applies direct restrictions on cross-border provision of financial services into the jurisdiction as well as precautionary capital charges for the EU entities when they use the services of certain third country entities. The DFA grants the CFTC and SEC the authority to prohibit an entity domiciled in a foreign country from participating in the United States in derivatives transactions, if either authority considers that the regulation of derivatives in that foreign country undermines the stability of the United States financial system (Section 715 of the DFA). of national jurisdictions. One model suggests that this might actually not be such a bad idea if the focus is solely on financial stability. 121 But theory also suggests that risk is better managed when it is not concentrated and markets are more liquid. More global financial markets can do more good than harm, e.g. in terms of increased liquidity, better means of risk diversification and more means of financing beneficial innovation -insofar as we manage to regulate away the stability risks. And perhaps most importantly, financial fragmentation is a clear indication of the failure the global derivatives reform. Why bother to agree on a global reform agenda in the first place if the result is a retreat to territorialism and protectionism?
Which way forward?
Bilateral regulatory export through a transatlantic deal?
Transgovernmental networks can promote convergence without Treaties and centralization through "the export of regulatory rules and practices from major powers to weaker states". 122 In this way territorialism indeed "matches legal authority to market power" 123 , meaning, in the context of financial markets, simply that "the bigger the capital market, the greater the influence of regulators." 124 In such a view, the transatlantic derivatives dispute does not come as a surprise. The power asymmetry between the Atlantic neighbours has been in steady decline. One reason for this has been the institutional evolution and the centralization of regulatory authority within the EU. 125 from general mutual understanding and familiarity as well as a degree of commonality with respect to regulatory interests and philosophies. 130 Coffee also proposes a more exclusive approach where the U.S. and the EU would take the lead. Rather than stand still and wait for the unlikely international consensus to emerge, a deeper transatlantic coordination would force other important jurisdictions to converge towards the high-quality US-EU standards. 131 Game theoretic assessments further support the hypothesis that coordination between great powers can effectively promote convergence. 132 In short, though the Regulate Thy Neighbour approach seems not to work well among equals, through cooperation between the equal powers the strategy's essence could be revived.
The EU and US have indeed recognized the need for deeper cooperation as well as the chance for joint leadership: "by coordinating our efforts, we are providing a model for other regulators and jurisdictions working to implement their G20 commitments."
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The case for mutual recognition and multilateralism At present international standards play little role when it comes to the most important cross-border issues. Even though the G20 jurisdictions demand that for instance their CCPs comply with the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures (known as PFMIs) the international principles do not provide any kind of minimum standard for the purposes of mutual recognition. Therefore, in principle all the additional requirements imposed for instance by EMIR on CCPs need to be adopted in foreign jurisdictions should they wish their CCPs to be able to offer services for European clients (or their offshore branches). The third country CCPs cannot voluntarily opt-in to more stringent EMIR standards either. 134 An interesting outcome of such a regime is that this could increase private demand for more stringent regulation, thus causing privately initiated racing to the most stringent (and powerful) regulatory regimes. 135 The transatlantic partnership has the promise of fostering convergence and thus mitigating the threat of regulatory arbitrage. But the problems of the Regulate Thy Neighbour strategy (see Section 4) will not be solved simply by turning a unilateral strategy into a bilateral one. In certain respects the problems could become even worse. Joint leadership, at least an active one, would only increase the coordination demands between the Atlantic partners.
There might be more fundamental problems still. An increasing number of academics point out that simply having and applying the same rules everywhere might not secure the reaching of a more stable 130 Pan, Eric J. "Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform." Vill. L. Rev. 55 (2010): 743, 770 (noting however that financial system. 136 According to one (rather theoretical) view a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach could actually introduce structural weakness into the system and increase systemic fragility. 137 On the basis of such views, the present generation of substituted compliance in the U.S. has also been criticized for its general hostility towards experimentation and diversity. 138 The problem with policy prescriptions relating to harmonisation and regulatory arbitrage is the analytical difficulty of distinguishing bad regulatory competition from more beneficial forms of competition and innovation. When regulators share similar objectives and functions, regulatory competition can create positive experimentation. 139 The positive dimensions of regulatory pluralism should not be neglected. 140 Moreover, categorical arguments against harmonisation and the associated rigidity risks at times neglect the difference between minimum harmonisation, comprising the adoption of common minimum standards in order to prevent regulatory race to the bottom, and rigid maximum harmonisation which details the same rules for everybody and prohibits the adoption of stricter rules.
In the global market for derivatives, the first step towards mutual recognition would be to further increase the normativity of international expert standards and benchmarks such as CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs). In the shadow of unilateralism, much important work is being done in multilateral standardisation bodies.
141 BCBS-IOSCO have also adopted joint standards for margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.
142 These principles are gradually being integrated in unilateral comparability assessments, but the second, and much bigger, step would be to hand the task of making equivalence or comparability assessments to an objective international body.
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Some academics have envisioned "managed" mutual recognition schemes (i.e. based on bilateral formal mutual recognition agreements) without a "global government." Such mutual recognition regimes have been seen as an important part of global administrative law regimes, representing "a coordinated approach to the regulation of global market processes among diverse jurisdictions". 144 But formalisation of bilateral mutual recognition schemes would seem to be an unnecessary step towards workable forms global financial governance, considering especially the resource-incentive nature of continuous comparability assessments as well as the general agility and elasticity of financial markets (adding to the incompleteness of sovereign contracts as well as to the costs of contracting). It is 136 See e.g. Riles 140 Riles, op. cit., 75 (referring also to works of Pistor and Romano).
141 "Moreover, I think there is a better way to consider whether we need international standards on margining that are more granular than the PFMIs. That is the current CPMI-IOSCO process that is already underway. Both Europe and the U.S. are participants. That group, for example, is reviewing the practices by a number of clearinghouses on more than 100 different areas of margin methodologies." Remarks Of CFTC Chairman Timothy Massad Before The OTC Derivatives Conference, September 29, 2015. 142 The Financial Stability Board has designated altogether 14 key standards for sound financial systems. The policy areas are macroeconomic policy and data transparency, financial regulation and supervision and institutional and market infrastructure. <http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_standards/> (last visited 3 February 2016). 143 As suggested by Artomonov, op. cit.
probably because of the latter reason why international finance, unlike trade, has resisted more formalised forms of international governance in the first place. 145 There seems to be an emerging consensus that effective governance of financial markets requires the pooling of some degree of sovereignty on the supra-state level. 146 Cases have even been made for either a new treaty-based international financial organisation 147 , or for channelling the global reforms through the existing international structures such as the WTO. 148 The coordination problems and protectionist pressures provide strong support for this case. IOSCO's track record in promulgating widely accepted principles and multilateral cooperation devices especially in the area of enforcement cooperation, would make it the most indicate international body for receiving more formal powers and responsibilities in settling international coordination issues. 149 A recent proposal argues for strengthening the role of the FSB. 150 But despite its increasing importance and the emergence of organizational hierarchies, the decisions of the FSB continue to be non-binding on its members, and its operative powers remain limited to "moral suasion and peer pressure". 151 The crisis momentum did not lead to multilateral treaty negotiations and the governance regime for international finance remains soft at its core.
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Conclusions
The big question behind this article could be formulated as follows: can we coordinate our way around the Financial Trilemma in the absence of hard-law based international or supranational structures? Recall that the Trilemma posits that only two of the three objectives of financial stability, national financial policies and financial integration can be achieved. Can bilateral coordination measures bring about enough convergence so that borders for capital can be kept open without at the same time enabling regulatory arbitrage and race-to-the-bottom competition, which would eventually dilute the objective of financial stability? Or do we have to give up instead on globalisation and market integration and let the present tendency of market fragmentation and new protectionism foster?
The prolonged dispute between the US and EU seems to present a case against the possible benefits of coordination-driven transgovernmentalism. The regulatory turf war is all the more disconcerting given that the communication channels and early forms of collaboration between the Atlantic neighbours were established already more than ten years ago. 153 A number of immediate lessons can be drawn from the network failure. Perhaps the most important one is that global reforms should be coordinated better already when draft legislation is tabled. The authorities implementing the legislations should also have clear and compatible mandates. This paper nevertheless suggests careful optimism about the short-term benefits of closing the transatlantic deal. The deal would be crucial for stopping or at least slowing down the on-going market fragmentation between the US and EU as well as to bringing much needed convergence for countering the immediate regulatory arbitrage threats in the Transatlantic context. In the longer run the present Regulate Thy Neighbour strategies, which build on extraterritoriality, protectionism and limited deference, cannot be sustained. Therefore we need simultaneous building of a more multilateral regime based on embryonic forms of mutual recognition. In what organizational form this should take place will be left for further research.
